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There are two important rules in a patent race: what an innovator must accomplish to receive
the patent and the allocation of the bene¯ts that °ow from the innovation. Most patent races end
before R&D is completed and the prize to the innovator is often less than the social bene¯t of the
innovation. We study the optimal combination of prize and minimal accomplishment necessary
to obtain a patent in a dynamic multistage innovation race. A planner, who cannot distinguish
between competing ¯rms, chooses the innovation stage at which the patent is awarded and the
magnitude of the prize to the winner. We examine both social surplus and consumer surplus
maximizing patent race rules. We show that a key consideration is the e±ciency costs of prizes
and of monopoly power to the patentholder. Our results indicate that races are undesirable only
when e±ciency costs are low, ¯rms have similar technologies, and the planner maximizes social
surplus. In all other circumstances, the optimal policy spurs innovative e®ort through a race of
nontrivial duration. Races are also used to ¯lter out inferior innovators.
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11 Introduction
Patent systems use races to spur innovation. Firms compete to be the ¯rst to develop a new product
and obtain a patent and monopoly rights to sell that product. It's been long argued (see Wright
(1983) for an earlier criticism) that patent systems may be suboptimal mechanisms because they
spark races and generate wasteful duplication of e®ort. As Loury (1979) noted, races also have
o®setting bene¯ts: increased investment leads to quicker innovation. Therefore a patent system
designed to encourage innovation must carefully weigh the bene¯ts of quick innovation against the
over-investment cost generated by races. In this paper, we provide a model of optimal patent rules
that endogenizes the choice of races in designing incentives for innovation. Our environment has two
important features. First, we assume that innovation is a multistage process and ¯nd that the waste
induced by patent races can be moderated by ¯ling requirements, that is, by deciding the stage of an
innovation process at which the patent is granted. Second, we explicitly model the product market
ine±ciencies of a patent monopoly and argue that these ine±ciencies must be considered along with
any waste generated by a patent race when evaluating patent policies. In general, there are two ways
to stimulate innovation: o®er a big prize to a single innovator, or o®er a smaller prize but use a race
to threaten each ¯rm that the prize will go to his competitor. When both incentive devices have
ine±ciencies, it is generally best to use both.
We model races as multistage stochastic games between heterogenous ¯rms. Firms di®er in their
cost of innovation. They proceed through several stages of progress (e.g. rough idea, blue print,
prototype), with the ¯nal stage culminating in successful innovation and a marketable product. For
a given patent policy, our dynamic, stochastic innovation race resembles those studied by Fudenberg
et al. (1983) and Harris and Vickers (1985a,b, 1987). However, we endogenize patent policy by
embedding this game into the problem of a patent authority that selects the rules governing the
races.
We study the optimal policy of a patent authority who can verify partial success at the time of
a patent application, but cannot observe an individual ¯rm's e±ciency. The patent authority has
access to policy tools typically used in patent systems. First, it chooses when to award the patent,
namely, it chooses the innovation stage at which a patent or an exclusive contract is awarded to
a ¯rm and the race is terminated. This represents the minimal accomplishment necessary and the
¯ling requirements to obtain a patent and sets the length of a patent race. Firms race as long as
no ¯rm has achieved this level, but as soon as one has met the requirements of the patent rules, it
proceeds with exclusive rights to develop the product. Second, the authority chooses how much of
the bene¯ts of an innovation go to the patent holder. This allocation is a®ected by rules such as
patent length, patent breadth, and renewal fees.
Most analyses of patent policy focus on the optimal duration and breadth of patent protection1,
1For example, Gilbert and Shapiro (1990), O'Donoghue et al. (1998), Denicolo (1999), Hopenhayn and Mitchell
2but assume that a ¯rm does not receive a patent until its R&D process is complete2. We distinguish
between the stage a patent is granted and the end of the innovation process. This distinction allows
us to evaluate the desirability of races and to analyze the e®ects of the race length on the pace
and cost of innovation preceding and following a patent. This assumption is consistent with actual
innovation processes. Firms often receive patents for a product in its early development stages,
bear signi¯cant expenditures afterwards and reap ¯nancial bene¯ts only when R&D is ¯nished and
the product is marketed. This feature is seen in many of the case histories of important inventions
examined in Jewkes et al. (1969). For example, the ¯rst patents for xerography were granted many
years before the ¯rst copy machine, and far more money was spent on development of the transistor
after the patent was granted than before. When a patent should be granted represents a fundamental
question in the design of patent policy. We show that this choice has important implications for the
costs and bene¯ts of innovation.
In our environment, the patent authority must weigh three considerations. These are the time
at which R&D is completed and the product is ready, the potential waste of a patent race and the
welfare loss in the product market from patent monopolies. If we make the conventional assumption
that no patent is granted until all R&D is completed and choose a long life for the patent, then there
will be much over-investment in the patent race and large welfare loss from the patent monopoly, but
an early product introduction time. The waste in the patent race can be eliminated by an early grant
of the patent or a smaller reward. Decreasing the value of the patent, by lowering patent length and
breadth, will reduce the product market ine±ciencies, and reduce the excessive investment activity,
but may lead to poor intertemporal resource allocation in a multistage patent race. Additionally, it
may be di±cult to ¯lter out the less e±cient ¯rm when patents are granted early; even ¯rms with
larger costs of innovation may ¯nd it feasible to compete for a few stages to obtain a valuable patent.
A priori, it is not obvious which e®ect dominates in choosing the optimal policy.
We show that both policy instruments, when to award the patent and rewards to the winner,
will generally be used to spur competition and innovation. In most circumstances, under reasonable
assumptions about product markets, it is optimal for a social surplus maximizing patent authority
to grant a patent after considerable progress has been made by the ¯rms. In other words, races
are desirable. They serve two important purposes in our model. First, the patent authority uses
races to motivate innovators when the prize alone cannot, due to ine±ciencies or limitations, provide
adequate incentives. Second, a patent race serves as a ¯ltering device. A race is used to increase the
chance that the patent is rewarded to the most e±cient innovator.
Another important factor that in°uences the optimal mix of the two policy instruments is the
preferences of the patent authority. We consider two di®erent speci¯cations { social and consumer
surplus { whereas most analyses in the patent literature focus only on social surplus. We examine
(2001), Wright (1999), Green and Scotchmer (1995).
2Perry and Vincent (2002) is an exception. See Section 3 for a more thorough comparison of their setup and ours.
3optimal patent policy when the patent authority maximizes consumer surplus because it may rep-
resent the preferences of the median voter who is likely to be a consumer waiting for new goods.
We show that consumer surplus maximizing patent authorities always prefer races, with or without
product market distortions.
Our choice of patent policy instruments is in°uenced by existent national patent institutions.
National patent systems are applied uniformly to all inventions and use a small set of tools such as
¯ling requirements, duration and scope of a patent, and renewal fees.3 Our focus is on the trade-o®s
between using a race versus wealth transfers to the winner, so we examine the interaction of two
instruments: when to grant a patent and the value of the patent to the winner. The value of the
patent incorporates other patent policy details such as breadth, duration and scope, therefore we
do not model them separately. We also ¯nd that our insights are robust to the addition of other
instruments. For example, we consider the possibility of using an auction to ¯nd the more e±cient
innovator and avoid excessive transfers to it. We show that when deadweight losses from patent
monopolies and/or patent prizes are signi¯cant, races are still part of the optimal patent policy
even when auctions are available. The key fact is that racing is a useful alternative to stimulating
innovative e®ort when the use of large prizes as an incentive device is limited by their nontrivial
ine±ciency costs.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our model of a patent race and describes
the patent authority's problem. Section 3 discusses the relevant literature and elaborates on the
di®erences between our approach and those contained in related papers. Section 4 reports our
numerical results and provides robustness checks. Section 5 discusses optimal patent policies when
the patent authority has little information about the costs and bene¯ts of innovation. Section 6
concludes the paper with a discussion of possible extensions of the present analysis. All proofs and
a detailed description of our numerical method are included in the Appendices.
2 A Model of Patent Policy for Multistage R&D Processes
We use a multistage stochastic innovation race model to evaluate patent policies. The introduction
of a new product requires the completion of N stages of development by pro¯t-maximizing ¯rms
that di®er in their cost of R&D e®ort. We assume that each ¯rm controls a separate innovation
process. They have perfect information about each other's cost structure and position and choose
their investment levels simultaneously. Each ¯rm begins at stage 0 and the ¯rm that ¯rst reaches the
3Our model can also be used in a procurement context. The main distinction between patent systems and pro-
curement problems is that in the latter case, the buyer can draw on a much larger set of instruments to give proper
incentives to competitors. For example, the buyer could o®er some payments to the loser and could require some
interim reporting to monitor ¯rms' progress. In procurement problems, each buyer can design an incentive system
that is tailored for the particular product in question. Our focus in this paper is on national patent systems which use
limited set of instruments.
4stage D · N obtains exclusive rights to continue. The value of D corresponds to ¯ling requirements
for a patent. After winning the race, the patentholder completes the ¯nal N ¡ D stages without
competition. When the patentholder reaches stage N, the patentholder markets the new product
and earns the rents from a patent monopoly.
We use D to represent a ¯rm's e®ort before it receives a patent relative to the total e®ort
required to produce a marketable good. Our model calibrates costs so that D=N roughly represents
the fraction of total expected cost incurred before a patent is granted. It is clear that D is neither
0 nor N in most patent systems: for most industries substantial expenditures occur before and
after patents are granted. For example, pharmaceutical ¯rms bear large R&D cost before receiving
patents, but most also spend large sums on proving the safety and e±cacy of any drug after receiving
the patent. Our environment allows us to analyze the trade-o® between extended monopoly power
given to a patent recipient if D = 0 and the cost of duplicated e®ort in a long race if D = N. We
also examine how the choice of D a®ects the other parameters of patent policy.
A patent granting authority (hereafter, PGA), who cannot continuously monitor all races and
has imperfect information about the cost structures of ¯rms involved, chooses the rules that govern
races. Consistent with real patent systems, we assume that the PGA has only two policy tools: ­,
the prize to the patentholder, and D, the stage at which a patent is awarded. If D = 0; then there
is no race. It also represents the case where the patent requirements are so minor that the patent
goes to whomever, with trivial e®ort, ¯rst comes up with the barest notion of the innovation. In
the game, it formally corresponds to the PGA giving the patent at random to one of the ¯rms. The
key assumption is that in this case each ¯rm has equal chance of winning without having made any
investment. The prize, on the other hand, may be literally a cash prize or, like a patent, it may be
a grant of a monopoly which produces a pro¯t °ow with present value ­. In the latter case, ­ is
meant to represent many features of a patent. For example, ­ is small if the patent life is short or
if it has small breadth, or if renewal fees are large. We tacitly assume that patent breadth, length,
renewal fee rules that are associated with a speci¯c ­ have already been determined by the PGA.
We next model the post-innovation market. We let B denote the potential value to society from
the invention. This includes the potential social surplus of a new good as well as any technological
or knowledge spillover into other markets. The allocation of social bene¯ts B is a®ected by patent
policies. Figure 1 displays the per-period allocation before the patent has expired. Suppose that
demand is given by DD and that there is a constant marginal cost of production. Figure 1 assumes
that the patentholder can sell the new good at the monopoly price, but not engage in price discrim-
ination, creating a pro¯t Pf for the ¯rm and leaving consumers with a surplus of CS. The area H
represents the deadweight loss from monopoly pricing.
Once the patent has expired, the good is assumed to sell competitively at marginal cost, implying
that consumers will receive all the social bene¯ts, which equal CS + Pf + H. Pro¯ts from patents
are proportional to demand, and, therefore, roughly proportional to social bene¯ts B. Hence we










assume that the prize to the patentholder is ­ = °B; it equals a proportion ° of the present value
of potential social bene¯t.
In Figure 1, the deadweight loss H represents the social cost of monopoly pro¯ts in the patent
system.4 More generally, we assume that the deadweight loss is proportional to the pro¯ts received
by the innovator, and is equal to µ­ = µ°B for some µ ¸ 0. For example, µ = 0:5 in Figure 1. This
linear speci¯cation for the deadweight loss captures the basic point that ° > 0 causes ine±ciencies,
and is an exact description of this loss when demand is linear and marginal costs are constant, as well
as, when demand has constant elasticity and marginal cost is zero. There are similar ine±ciencies
when ­ is a cash prize ¯nanced by distortionary taxes. In that case, µ represents the marginal
e±ciency cost of funds, a number which can plausibly be as low as 0.1 or as high as 1, depending on
estimates of various elasticities, tax policy parameters, and the source of marginal funds; see Judd
(1987) for a discussion of these factors. Therefore, the µ parameter represents either the relation
between deadweight loss and pro¯ts for monopoly or the marginal e±ciency cost of tax revenue.
While any patent is in e®ect, the ¯rm receives pro¯ts, the consumers receive some bene¯t, but
some of B is wasted in the transfer process. We assume that the patentholder's pro¯ts are °B but
that the deadweight loss due to ine±ciencies is µ°B, leaving consumers with B ¡ °B ¡ µ°B.
We consider two di®erent speci¯cations of the PGA's preferences: social and consumer surplus.
Most analyses assume that social surplus is the appropriate objective, but it is not clear that this
4Price controls may be used to reduce the deadweight loss, but they would also reduce monopoly pro¯ts and the
prize. Long-lived patents increase ° but at the expense of increasing the total deadweight losses of monopoly. Cash
prizes may be granted by the PGA along with shorter duration patents. This reduces the time during which the market
experiences the deadweight loss H, but it only creates other ine±ciencies since society bears the distortionary cost of
the taxes used to ¯nance the prize. Therefore, there are ine±ciencies no matter what ¯nancing scheme is used.
6should always hold. For example, in a procurement context one suspects that the PGA does not care
about the pro¯ts of the participants in the race. Also, some argue that Congress should choose patent
policy to maximize social surplus, but it is also imaginable that Congress will consider maximizing
consumers' welfare if the median voter is more of a consumer than a producer. Social surplus,
denoted by WS(D;°;µ;B); is equal to the present discounted value of the social bene¯t, B, minus the
deadweight losses of transfers to the patentholder, µ­, and minus the total investment expenditures
of all innovators in the patent race. Consumer surplus WC(D;°;µ;B), on the other hand, is equal
to the present discounted value of the social bene¯t, B, minus the transfers to the patentholder and
its associated deadweight loss: (1 ¡ °)B ¡ µ­. The precise statements of the PGA's objectives are
stated in Appendix B.3, along with our numerical method that solves for the optimal policy.
There may be ways other than a patent race to encourage R&D, but those alternatives typically
cause ine±ciencies. For example, a government could give a prize to an inventor, but then insist that
it should be produced in a competitive market. This would avoid the monopoly ine±ciencies of a
patent, but at the cost of distortionary taxation to ¯nance the prize. Similar concerns would apply
to government ¯nanced research labs. Furthermore, most R&D takes place outside of government
sponsored programs. Our analysis of the PGA's problem takes into account the ine±ciencies of the
PGA's choices.
2.1 The Firms: A Multistage Model of Racing
The patent race with a speci¯c ­ and D creates a dynamic game between two ¯rms5. Let xi;t denote
¯rm i's stage at time t. We assume that each ¯rm starts at stage 0; therefore, x1;0 = x2;0 = 0. If ¯rm
i is at stage n then it can either stay at n or advance to n + 16, where the probability of jumping
to n + 1 depends on ¯rm i's investment, denoted ai 2 A = [0; ¹ A] ½ R+. The upper bound ¹ A on




xi;t; with probability p(xi;tjai;t;xi;t)
xi;t+1; with probability p(xi;t + 1jai;t;xi;t):
There are many functional forms we could use for p(xja;x). We choose a probability structure so that
innovation resembles search and sampling. Let F(xjx) = p(xj1;x), that is, F (xjx) is the probability
5We focus on the duopoly case for reasons of tractability and ease of exposition. We also believe that the duopoly
case can serve as a valid approximation for the monopolistically competitive markets where most innovations take
place.
6We have computed solutions to our model with ¯rms being able to advance more than one stage in each period.
These changes do not lead to any results that contradict the basic insights of this paper. Computational results with
larger jumps can be obtained from the authors upon request.
7that there is no change in the state if a = 1. For general values of a we assume
p(xja;x) = F(xjx)a (1)
p(x + 1ja;x) = 1 ¡ F(xjx)a:
This speci¯cation is analogous to hiring a people to work for one period and having them work
independently on the problem of moving ahead one stage. While this speci¯cation is a special one,
its simple statistical foundation helps us interpret our results.7
During R&D, ¯rm i's cost function is Ci(a); i = 1;2. It is assumed to be strictly increasing and
weakly convex in a. For the remainder of the paper, we assume the cost function for ¯rm i takes the
following form
Ci(a) = cia´; ´ ¸ 1; ci > 0; i = 1;2:
Firms discount future costs and revenues at the common rate of ¯ < 1 and maximize their expected
discounted payo®s.
2.2 Equilibrium
The patent race involves two phases. When one of the ¯rms reaches stage D; it is awarded the patent
and becomes the only innovator. We refer to the subsequent innovation stages as the monopoly phase
and denote it by XM = fD;D + 1;:::;Ng. Prior to the monopoly phase the position of the two
¯rms is described by x = (x1;x2). We refer to the set of states before the patent is granted as the
duopoly phase and denote it by XD = f(x1;x2)jxi 2 f0;:::;Dg;i = 1;2g: Since we employ backward
induction to solve for the equilibrium of the game, we ¯rst solve for the monopoly phase and then
for the duopoly phase.
2.2.1 Monopoly Phase
Firm i precedes as a monopoly after it receives the patent. We formulate ¯rm i's monopoly problem
recursively. At the terminal stage N, the innovation process is over and ¯rm i receives a prize of ­.
In stages D through N ¡1, it spends resources on investment. Let V M
i (xi) denote the value function
of ¯rm i if it is a monopoly in state xi. V M
i solves the Bellman equation
V M
















; D · xi < N
V M
i (N) = ­: (2)
7This speci¯cation allows only forward movement. This is typical of most of the patent race literature, although
exceptions are present. See Doraszelski (2001) for a model with \forgetting", that is, xt+1 may be less than xt.
8The policy function aM
i of a ¯rm i monopolist is de¯ned by
aM
















; D · xi < N: (3)
Proposition 1 Firm i's monopoly problem at state xi 2 f0;1;:::;Ng has a unique optimal solution
aM
i (xi): The value function V M
i and the policy function aM
i are nondecreasing in the state xi:
Proof. See Appendix A.
2.2.2 Duopoly Phase
We formulate the competition between the ¯rms before stage D as a duopoly game. In the analysis of
this game we restrict attention to Markov strategies. A pure Markov strategy ¾i : XD ! A for ¯rm
i is a mapping from the state space X to its investment set A: We de¯ne the ¯rms' value functions
recursively. Let Vi(x) represent the value of ¯rm i's value function if the two ¯rms are in state
x = (x1;x2) 2 XD. We use the conventional notation that x¡i (a¡i) denote the state (action) of
¯rm i's opponent. If at least one of the ¯rms has reached the patent stage D; ¯rm i's value function






i (xi); for x¡i < xi = D
V M
i (xi)=2; for xi = x¡i = D
0; for xi < x¡i = D:
(4)



















; x1;x2 < D: (5)





















; x1;x2 < D: (6)
We now de¯ne the Markov perfect equilibrium of the race.
De¯nition 1 A Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) is a pair of value functions Vi; i = 1;2; and a
pair of strategy functions ¾¤
i ; i = 1;2; such that
1. Given ¾¤
¡i; the value function Vi solves the Bellman equation (5), i = 1;2.
92. Given the value functions Vi, and the strategy function of his opponent, the strategy function
¾¤
i for player i solves equation (6), i = 1;2.
A Markov perfect equilibrium always exists.
Theorem 1 There exists a Markov perfect equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Our model does not admit a closed form solution. We use numerical methods to establish our
results and check their robustness by computing the optimal patent policy for a large collection of
cases covering a broad range of parameter speci¯cations. Our computational results are discussed in
Section 4 and our numerical procedure is detailed in Appendix B.
3 Related Literature
This paper contributes to a growing literature that studies the implications of R&D competition on
the design of optimal patent policy and bridges a gap between two distinct lines of research. The ¯rst
of these lines focuses on R&D competition, taking patent policy as given. The second endogenizes
patent policy, but largely abstracts from the R&D competition that precedes the award of the patent.
Early contributions to the ¯rst line of research include Kamien and Schwartz (1982), Loury
(1979), Lee and Wilde (1980), Reinganum (1981, 1982) and Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980a,b). In
these models, the probability that a ¯rm successfully obtains a patent at each date depends only on
the ¯rm's current R&D expenditure and not on its past R&D experience. Competition takes place
in \memoryless" or \Poisson" environments (see also the survey article by Reinganum (1989)). This
¯rst generation of models was subsequently extended by Fudenberg et al. (1983) and Harris and
Vickers (1985a,b, 1987) to incorporate learning or experience e®ects. Throughout, patent policy was
taken as given.
In contrast, contributions to the second line of research, including Nordhaus (1969), Klemperer
(1990), Gilbert and Shapiro (1990), O'Donoghue, Scotchmer, Thisse (1998), Denicolo (1999, 2000),
and Hopenhayn and Mitchell (2001), Llobet, Hopenhayn and Mitchell (2006), endogenize the pol-
icymaker's choice of patent length and/or breadth. However, these papers largely abstract from
the R&D races that precede the award of a patent. Rather, they focus upon the trade-o® between
providing current incentives for innovations and minimizing post-innovation distortions.
Our paper is complementary to a growing body of work that studies the e®ects of patent policy
on the strategic interaction between competing ¯rms in alternative environments. Amongst these
are Scotchmer and Green (1990, 1995) and Perry and Vincent (2002). The ¯rst paper by Scotchmer
and Green focuses upon the novelty requirement and disclosure aspects of patent law and their
implications for the pace of innovation. Their second paper involves the role of patent licensing
10in environments with successive innovations. Both papers consider a truncated R&D phase, with
two stages of innovation only. We consider a multistage innovation race which enables us to make a
distinction between the stage at which a patent can be awarded and the stage at which an innovation
is successfully completed. This distinction is also made by Perry and Vincent (2002), whose focus is
on an implementation problem that induces the laggard participants in a patent/procurement race
to drop out without distorting incentives to invest when the planner does not know the innovation
stage ¯rms are in. Our environment di®ers from theirs along a few lines. First, the informational
asymmetry in our model stems from the inability of the planner to observe the cost of investment,
rather than the innovation phase. Second, in our setting, the prize to the winner of the patent, which
incorporates patent length and breadth, is endogenously determined, and is not a parameter. Third,
we explicitly incorporate into our model externalities from monopoly distortions or deadweight loss
of taxes used to ¯nance them. Incorporation of these externalities into the model allows us to study
the e®ectiveness of races in spurring innovation when the ability of the patent authority to use prizes
is limited. We do, however, abstract from possible transactions and cooperation between innovators
modeled in Scotchmer and Green (1995), even where such cooperation may be socially bene¯cial.
In an extension of this paper, we have examined equilibrium with technology trades and found
conditions under which they will occur. We have checked that the results for optimal patent rules
considered in this paper are not signi¯cantly a®ected by these trades.
Our patent instruments are di®erent from those utilized in multiple innovation settings considered
in O'Donoghue, Scotchmer and Thisse (1998) and Hopenhayn, Llobet, and Mitchell (2006). In
O'Donoghue et. al., the focus is on increasing pro¯ts for successive improvements in innovation while
minimizing monopoly distortions. The patent authority is assumed to have several instruments that
control the length and the breadth of the patent. The optimal mixture of these instruments is not
identi¯ed, instead two types of policies, with di®erent lengths and breadths are compared in terms
of the e®ects they have on the di®usion and costs of innovation. In Hopenhayn et al., the focus is on
optimal rewards for successive innovation and a system of buyouts and licensing that can implement
these rewards. Again, the policy instruments are the length and the scope of the patent. Our model
is about a single innovation, not a sequence of innovations. Our main emphasis is on the role of
races: During the innovation phase of a single good, at what stage should a patent-type protection
be given and races be terminated? We are not concerned with the decomposition of the prize to
the winner into patent breadth or depth. Patent breadth issues, protection from imitation, length
of patents are all represented by the prize in our setting. We choose our parameters of the model
so that the imposition of a reasonable time limit on the duration of innovation from the time a ¯rm
gets the patent to the time it reaches the ¯nal stage is not binding.
Patent races are not the only mechanism for spurring innovation. Research tournaments, where
contestants compete to ¯nd the innovation with the highest value to the sponsor and receive a pre-
speci¯ed prize if successful, can be and are used to achieve a similar goal. Research tournaments are
11particularly useful when research inputs are unobservable and research outcomes cannot be veri¯ed
by courts. Taylor (1995), Fullerton and McAfee (1999) are amongst the papers that study such tour-
naments, the former in an environment with identical ¯rms, the latter with ¯rms of heterogenous
ability. Innovation races and research tournaments di®er both in institutional and model details.
In a single, well-de¯ned innovation race, the quality requirement is ¯xed, the time of innovation
is variable. The focus in on the pace of innovation and the competition between the ¯rms. In a
research tournament, quality is variable, the terminal date, on the other hand, is ¯xed. In research
tournaments, the emphasis is on the quality of the product, not on the pace of innovation. In the
McAfee-Fullerton model, an entry auction ¯lters out less e±cient ¯rms, in our model, ¯ltering is
achieved by varying the quality requirement in most cases, even when auctions are available. Our
goal is to endogenize the choice of races and to study the changes in the innovation pace and intensity
when quality requirements and prizes are chosen optimally. Thus we ¯nd patent races to be the most
natural environments8 in which to achieve this goal.
4 Results
In this section we report results from our computational procedure detailed in Appendix B.
4.1 Benchmark case
We begin our analysis with a simple, canonical example with linear technology, identical ¯rms, and
no deadweight loss associated with the prize. This is the case that's been extensively studied in the
innovation race literature. In this special case, there is obviously no value to a race since the PGA's
problem can be perfectly internalized in a ¯rm's pro¯t maximizing strategy. If the PGA awards
the project to one ¯rm with the full social value as the prize before any of the ¯rms start investing
(i.e. D = 0), then the ¯rm's pro¯ts equal social surplus and the ¯rm chooses the socially optimal
investment level. A race would speed up innovation but lead to excessive investment.
Proposition 2 If costs are identical and linear (c = c2=c1 = 1 and ´ = 1), transfers to the patent
winner have no deadweight loss (µ = 0), and the PGA maximizes social surplus, then the optimal
policy sets ° = 1 and D = 0, implying no race.
Proposition 2 serves a useful benchmark, but relies on the assumption that monopolies have no
e±ciency costs or that taxes paid to the innovator have no distortionary cost. As we have stressed in
the introduction, we are interested in examining optimal patent rules when these ine±ciencies and
distortions are present. In the following sections, we report the changes in optimal patent rules as we
8See Scotchmer (1999) for an environment in which the patent system is optimal. She shows that if a direct
mechanism cannot use ex-post information on value or costs, the only feasible incentive mechanisms are patent renewals
systems with fees.
12move away from this special case of µ = 0. We also report results with heterogeneous and nonlinear
costs.
4.2 Model Parameterization
We now move away from the simple benchmark example by incorporating the ine±ciencies associated
with rewards, heterogenous ¯rms and non-linear technology. Table 1 displays the set of parameters
we use in our numerical computations.
Table 1: Parameter Values
¯ = 0:996 discount factor
N ² f5;10g number of stages of innovation
B = 100 total social bene¯t
´ 2 f1;1:5g elasticity of cost
µ 2 f0;0:1;0:25;0:4;1:0g deadweight loss parameter
c 2 f1;1:25;:::;4:75;5;6;:::;20g ratio of ¯rms' costs coe±cients, c2=c1. (c1 = 1)
F(xjx) = 0:5 transition probability for unit investment
These parameter values represent a wide range of cases. We make two normalizations: c1 = 1
and F (xjx) = :5. We report detailed results from a 5-stage race only. Races with more stages do
not provide any additional insights or change our qualitative results. The µ values are motivated by
ine±ciency costs of monopoly for standard demand curves and by the excess burden results in Judd
(1987). The value of B is chosen so that races are neither too short nor too long. In general, the
parameter values in Table 1 are chosen to represent innovation processes lasting from several months
to a few years. Optimal choices for ° are restricted to lie in a discrete set f0:02;0:04;0:06;:::;1:0g:
4.3 Social Surplus Maximization
We now examine the case of social surplus maximization and the impact of cost heterogeneity and
deadweight losses in optimal patent rules. Throughout this and subsequent sections, we use the term
short (long) race to describe a patent awarded at a lower (higher) innovation stage. The terms slow
and quick are used to describe the time it takes for ¯rms to complete the innovation.
4.3.1 Deadweight Loss and Homogenous Firms
We ¯rst examine the e®ect of deadweight losses in optimal patent rules by including a positive µ
while maintaining the assumption that ¯rms are homogenous and have linear costs of investment.
There are important reasons for considering identical and linear costs. If ¯rms are heterogeneous,
the planner would prefer a race to ensure that the more e±cient ¯rm is not eliminated by bad luck. If
¯rms have convex costs, the planner would also prefer a race since two ¯rms can achieve a rate of total
13innovation more cheaply than each can do individually. By assuming linear and homogenous costs,
we isolate the e®ect of product market distortions on the patent rules. In this case the only reason
for having a race and bearing the e±ciency costs of duplicated e®ort is to reduce the deadweight loss
associated with the patent prize.
Figure 2: Policy tradeo®s with linear and identical costs.











































Figure 2 displays the typical policy trade-o® between races and the patent prize as µ increases
from 0 to 0.5. The D = 0 line displays social welfare when one of the two identically e±cient ¯rms
receives the patent at T = 0 and the prize ° is set to its optimal value. The D = 4 line displays
social welfare when the patent goes to the ¯rst ¯rm to reach stage four out of ¯ve and the prize °
is set to its optimal value. Figure 2 shows that when µ is small, the planner prefers innovation with
a monopolist as in the benchmark case of no deadweight loss, but when µ exceeds 0.25, the planner
switches to using a race. Note that µ = 0:25 is a small value for deadweight losses; for a monopolist
with a linear demand curve µ = 0:50 . Figure 2 shows that the planner prefers a race even in the
presence of small deadweight losses in the product market.
Figure 2 also displays how the optimal choice of ° is a®ected by the deadweight loss parameter µ
and the choice of D. When µ = 0, °¤ = 1, but °¤ falls rapidly as µ increases. Even when the planner
chooses monopolistic innovation, the optimal prize gives the innovator only a small fraction of the
total social bene¯t. These small values of ° correspond to a combination of a short patent life and
small patent breadth. Furthermore, as µ increases and the planner chooses to switch to a race, the
optimal ° falls even further. For example, at µ = 0:30, the optimal °¤ = 0:1 for the race, but would
have been 0:16 if D = 0 were optimal. When the planner switches to a race, there is duplication of
14e®ort, but this is ameliorated by reducing the prize. In cases with µ ¸ 0:25, the planner relies more
on the competition in the race rather than the prize to stimulate innovation because the deadweight
loss associated with the patent is large.
4.3.2 Heterogeneous Firms
We next add ¯rm heterogeneity, but maintain the linear cost assumption. Table 2 reports, for a
variety of µ values, the optimal prize, choice of D and social surplus as the cost asymmetry between
¯rms increase.
Table 2: Optimal Patent Policy for ¯ = 0:996, ´ = 1:0:
c µ D¤ °¤ WS=B
1.0 0.00 0 1.00 86.3
0.10 0 0.26 82.4
0.25 3 0.12 79.7
0.4 4 0.10 78.2
1.0 4 0.10 72.8
1.5 0.0 0 1.00 84.0
0.1 5 0.18 82.3
0.25 3 0.16 79.9
0.4 2 0.14 77.9
1.0 2 0.12 70.5
1.75 0.0 5 0.22 84.5
0.1 5 0.22 82.5
0.25 4 0.20 79.6
0.4 1 0.14 77.3
1.0 1 0.12 70.5
2 0 5 0.28 85.0
0.1 5 0.26 82.5
0.25 2 0.20 79.6
0.4 1 0.14 77.3
1.0 1 0.12 70.5
2.5 0 5 0.36 85.5
0.1 3 0.26 82.4
0.25 1 0.18 79.5
0.4 1 0.14 77.3
1.0 1 0.12 70.5
15When ¯rms are homogenous, and there is deadweight loss associated with the patent, the planner
relies more on the competition in the race rather than the prize to stimulate innovation. Hence the
length of the race, measured by D¤ is increasing in µ. When ¯rms are su±ciently heterogenous
(c ¸ 1:5) however, without a large enough prize, the less e±cient ¯rm ¯nds it too costly to race for a
long time and virtually drops out, providing no competition for the more e±cient ¯rm. In this case,
the planner increases the prize relative to the case of c = 1, and shortens the race length to provide
incentives for faster innovation. In the presence of cost heterogeneity, the optimal race length, D¤ is
decreasing in µ.
4.3.3 Convex Costs
We next consider the case of convex investment costs. Figure 3 shows the optimal prize to bene¯t
ratio °¤, and expected discounted social surplus WS as a function of the cost ratio of the two ¯rms,
c, when ´ = 1:5 and µ = 0. Each line in Figure 3 corresponds to a di®erent patent granting stage
D. The maximized social surplus is the upper envelope of the three lines in Figure 3. Therefore the
optimal patent granting stage is the D that corresponds to the highest line for a given cost ratio.
In this case, when investment costs are convex, the planner prefers both ¯rms to engage in R&D
because given a target rate of innovation, it is more e±cient to have both ¯rms working. Therefore
not all duplication of e®ort is wasteful. When ¯rms have similar costs, and the deadweight loss
parameter µ = 0, the optimal policy is to grant a patent to one of the ¯rms before any investment is
undertaken. Although a coin toss may grant the patent to the less e±cient ¯rm, the resulting loss in
social surplus is less than the ine±cient rent dissipation during a race. This result is overturned as c
continues to rise: now the cost of assigning the less e±cient ¯rm the patent at the beginning exceeds
the cost of overinvestment in a race. Thus the optimal patent rule changes to a full length race
(D¤ = 5) and a lower prize (°¤ = (0:48;0:60) for c = (4;5) respectively) and social surplus begins to
rise. At these intermediate cost ratios, the purpose of the race is twofold: to spur competition in the
initial stages of innovation and to ¯lter out the less e±cient ¯rm (Firm 2). At the beginning of the
race, the presence of Firm 2 motivates Firm 1 to innovate quickly. Once Firm 1 has a su±ciently
large lead9, Firm 2 reduces its investment level which lowers cost of duplication, and raises social
surplus. If the PGA chooses a small D; then competition is intense at the early stages of the race
and Firm 2 may win through luck. The PGA can discourage this by reducing the prize ­ = °B,
but a large reduction in the prize also lowers Firm 1's incentive to invest and innovate quickly after
stage D¤. Thus the optimal mix of races and prizes re°ect the careful balance between the bene¯ts
of quick innovation, allowing the more e±cient ¯rm to receive the patent and ine±ciency costs of
9A laggard ¯rm reduces its investment considerably (e®ectively drops out of the race), when the probability of
catching up to the leader is small and the investment cost of catching up is large. The su±cient gap between the two
¯rms that induces such a behavior depends on the Markov process for transition from one stage to the next and the
cost of investment. This result is analogous to the well known " ¡ preemption result in patent races.
16competition and prizes. When the deadweight loss of a prize, µ = 0, as in Figure 3, the PGA prefers
sets a long race (D¤ = 5), which enables it to ¯lter out the less e±cient ¯rm.
Figure 3: Social surplus for µ = 0:0:



































γ*=0.48  γ*=0.60 
γ*=0.52  γ*=1.0 
γ*=0.4 
γ*=0.24 
Table 3 reports the optimal policy rules in the presence of deadweight loss, ¯rm heterogeneity and
convex costs. With µ = 0, the PGA could use prizes to balance the bene¯ts of quick innovation and
total cost of investment. As in the case of linear cost, the trade-o®s the PGA faces are more complex
when the deadweight loss is high and its ability to vary the prize to spur innovation and competition
is more constrained. In these cases, the PGA is compelled to use races for quick innovation. A
long race (high D) can stimulate investment and competition, when ¯rms are alike. If ¯rms are
su±ciently heterogeneous, long races must be coupled with a large prize to motivate the ine±cient
¯rm to compete. Large prizes are very costly in this environment, unlike the previous case with
µ = 0, consequently a shorter race is chosen to motivate Firm 2 by increasing its chances of winning
the patent. However, this has an adverse e®ect; a short race is a less e®ective mechanism for ¯ltering
out Firm 2, thus social surplus declines for high values of µ, as the cost ratio increases and races
become shorter. This adverse e®ect persists until Firm 2's R&D costs are so large that it does not
participate even in a short race. At that point, a short race can ¯lter Firm 2 out, but works less
e®ectively as an incentive device: a decrease in competition allows Firm 1 to reduce its investment
level and leads to slower innovation. The comparative statics results reported in Table 3 highlight
the fact that the insights from the single example depicted in Figure 3 are robust to alternative
17parameterizations.
Table 3: Optimal Patent Policy for ¯ = 0:996, ´ = 1:5
c µ D¤ °¤ WS=B
1 0 0 1.00 87.7
0.1 0 0.34 83.0
0.25 5 0.10 81.3
0.4 5 0.10 79.9
1.0 5 0.08 75.5
1.5 0 0 1.0 86.2
0.1 5 0.16 82.1
0.25 5 0.14 80.2
0.4 4 0.12 78.6
1.0 3 0.08 73.3
1.75 0 0 1.00 85.5
0.1 5 0.18 82.2
0.25 4 0.14 80.0
0.4 4 0.14 78.2
1.0 3 0.10 72.7
2 0 0 1.00 84.9
0.1 5 0.20 82.4
0.25 4 0.16 79.9
0.4 3 0.12 78.0
1.0 3 0.10 72.3
2.5 0 5 0.28 85.2
0.1 5 0.24 82.9
0.25 4 0.18 79.9
0.4 3 0.14 77.8
1.0 2 0.10 71.6
Another interesting comparative static is with respect to the discount factor. Our numerical
exercises10 have shown that as the discount factor decreases, the present value of the prize decreases
and that dampens the incentive for a high investment level. Conditional on having a race of nontrivial
duration the discount factor is inversely related to the optimal °¤: higher prize levels are needed to
motivate the ¯rms.
10For brevity, we do not include these results in the paper. Detailed numerical results can be obtained from the
authors on request.
18Summary 1 The following results hold for ´ > 1:
1. Social surplus is decreasing in µ:
2. Conditional on the presence of a race,
(a) the optimal patent stage D¤ is weakly decreasing in µ and c.
(b) the optimal prize ratio °¤ is weakly decreasing in the discount factor and the deadweight
loss coe±cient µ.
Our results so far indicate that any patent policy analysis that does not include the deadweight
loss associated monopolies and prizes would recommend starkly di®erent patent rules depending
on the diversity of ¯rms engaged in innovation. It would favor larger prizes and no race under
homogeneity and a very long race and smaller prizes when reasonable heterogeneity is present11.
It would also suggest that ¯ling requirements be tailored to industry or innovation speci¯c cost
asymmetry. This would render the adoption and implementation of a universally applied patent
system very di±cult. Our (social surplus maximizing patent policy) analysis indicates that when
the deadweight losses are explicitly considered, and they are of a reasonable magnitude, the optimal
patent rule is less dependent on cost asymmetry. It favors granting of patents at middle stages of
development and reduction of patent length/breadth to decrease patent prizes. Patents should be
easier to obtain, but less valuable.
4.4 Consumer Surplus Maximization
We next examine the case where the planner maximizes consumer surplus. In this case, the cost of
innovation does not enter the PGA's objective function, so the PGA is only concerned about the
duration of the race and the fraction of the bene¯t that consumers can retain. A reduction of the
prize to the innovator increases consumer bene¯ts, but slows down the arrival of the innovation. One
way to relieve this tension is to use races to stimulate investment.
Figure 4 displays the optimal prize parameter °¤ and consumer surplus WC(¢) as a function of
the cost ratio c for µ = 0: Each line corresponds to a di®erent D. The maximized consumer surplus
is the upper envelope of the four lines in the ¯gures.
Several patterns are apparent in Figure 4. Consumer surplus decreases as the cost asymmetry
rises. At small cost ratios the PGA can rely on the intense competition among the ¯rms to ensure
that the ¯rms innovate quickly. Since the competition provides ample motivation for high investment
levels, the PGA can set the prize-to-bene¯t ratio ° to be very low and the patent stage to D = N = 5.
As c rises, the intensity of competition decreases since the ine±cient ¯rm reduces investment. The
11If the cost ratio is substantially high, the less e±cient ¯rm never invests, transforming the race e®ectively into a
monopoly innovation. In this case, the PGA raises the prize and eventually becomes indi®erent among all D ¸ 1.
19PGA remedies this by increasing ° and by choosing a lower D. These changes spur both ¯rms to
work harder in the duopoly phase without creating too much risk that the inferior ¯rm wins. In
Figure 4, °¤ increases from 0:10 to 0:12 and D¤ decreases from 5 to 2. As c increases further, even a
short duopoly phase is not enough to motivate the ¯rms. Since the PGA is reluctant to increase °,
the race becomes, for all practical purposes, just a monopoly innovation process by the more e±cient
¯rm. Thus the PGA is indi®erent between setting D to any value between 1 to N.
Figure 4: Consumer surplus, µ = 0:0:








































Table 4 displays results for sensitivity analysis with respect to the parameters ´;c; and µ and
con¯rm that the results displayed in Figure 4 are robust to changes in these parameters. The optimal
°¤ is always much smaller than under the objective of social surplus maximization, and changes only
slightly as deadweight loss, µ, and the cost ratio c change. Consumer surplus is decreasing in both
of these parameters.
The pattern of the D¤ values reported in Table 4 provides insights into the structure of our model
and, in particular, highlights the di®erence between strictly convex costs and linear costs. As the cost
of investment for Firm 2 increases, its investment level declines; Firm 2 poses less of a competitive
threat to Firm 1. In order to motivate both ¯rms, the PGA lowers the optimal patent stage D¤,
but this policy only partially motivates the ¯rms to choose higher investment levels. When the cost
of innovation is linear in investment e®ort and the cost ratio is su±ciently large, Firm 2 reduces its
investment level to zero and exits the race. Consequently, the probability of this ¯rm advancing is
20zero, and the optimal patent stage D¤ is set to 1. When the cost function is strictly convex; Firm 2
never chooses a zero investment level since C0(0) = 0, and always has a chance of reaching stage 1
before Firm 1. As a result, the optimal D¤ is always greater than 1. In some cases, for example, at
a cost ratio of c = 3 and µ = 0, D¤ may become as low as 2.
Table 4: Optimal Patent Policy for B = 100;¯ = 0:996.
´ = 1:5 ´ = 1:0
µ c D¤ °¤ WC=B D¤ °¤ WC=B
0 1 5 0.10 80.7 4 0.10 81.0
1:5 3 0.10 78.2 1 0.14 78.3
2 3 0.12 76.4 1 0.12 77.9
3 2 0.12 74.9 1 0.12 77.9
1 1 5 0.06 73.7 4 0.10 72.0
1:5 3 0.08 70.6 1 0.10 68.9
2 2 0.08 68.7 1 0.10 68.9
3 2 0.08 66.3 1 0.10 68.9
The results from consumer surplus maximization can be summarized as follows.
Summary 2 When the PGA maximizes consumer surplus the optimal patent policy exhibits the
following properties for parameters listed in Table 1.
1. The optimal patent policy has a nontrivial race, D¤ > 0:
2. The optimal prize to bene¯t ratio, °¤; is smaller than when the PGA maximizes social surplus,
weakly decreasing in µ:
3. The optimal patent granting stage, D¤; is weakly decreasing in µ:
4. For su±ciently small cost ratios, the optimal patent granting stage, D¤; is weakly decreasing in
c:
5. As the cost ratio c rises to in¯nity,
(a) The less e±cient ¯rm essentially exits the race and the more e±cient ¯rm proceeds as if
a monopolist.
(b) The PGA sets D¤ > 0 but becomes indi®erent between all positive D.
6. The expected duration of innovation process is longer due to lower investment level compared
to the social surplus maximization case.
7. Consumer surplus is weakly decreasing in c.
214.5 Auctions for allocating patent rights
In light of the popularity of auctions in the literature of mechanism design, some people may argue
that auctions at stage 0 would be a more e±cient way of allocating patent rights. It thus appears
to be worthwhile to examine auctions in our environment. In an extension of this paper, Judd,
Schmedders, Yeltekin (2007) provides a comprehensive comparison between auctions and races as
innovation mechanisms. Here we report some of the results from that extension, to emphasize the
importance of incorporating deadweight loss of prizes, parameterized by µ, into the patent policy
analysis. Suppose the PGA would hold a second-prize sealed-bid auction for the patent rights with
a prize of ­ = °B. The PGA's payo® from an auction of patent rights before any investment or
innovation takes place is the following:
PAuc(°;®;Ci;Cj;µ) = max
° fWAuc(i;0) + V M
j (0) + ®(V M
i (0) ¡ V M
j (0))g; (7)
where WAuc(i;0) is the time t = 0 expected present discounted consumer surplus from the innovation
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The values V M
i (0) and V M
j (0) represent the private values of the patent monopoly to ¯rm i and j
respectively and are de¯ned as follows. For k = i; j :
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V M
k (N) = °B:
The parameter ® is the Pareto weight placed on the ¯rms, and is set to 0 when the PGA maximizes
consumer surplus and to 1 in the case of social surplus maximization. In a second price auction where
the winning ¯rm pays the second bid, it is a well known result that the dominant strategy for each
¯rm is to bid exactly its expected net present value of the patent. In our environment, these private
values are equal to the monopoly values for each ¯rm. Under such a bidding strategy, the more
e±cient ¯rm, Firm 1, would always win the patent. Observe that we have already calculated the
social surplus from such an auction for all possible values of c and µ. Tables 5 and 6 report
the maximized social surplus from the patent race for ´ = 1:0 and ´ = 1:5 and when ¯rms are
homogenous. The social surplus from the second price auction
22PAuc(°;1;Ci;Cj;µ) = max
° fWAuc(i;0) + V M
i (0)g
is equivalent to the social surplus from the race with homogenous ¯rms when D is set to 0.
It is clear from these tables (and Tables 2 and 3 from Section 4.3) that given a choice between two
mechanisms { auctions and patent races { a social surplus maximizing PGA would prefer auctions,
regardless of cost heterogeneity, if µ · 0:1. When µ ¸ 0:25, however, in the patent race, the PGA
prefers to set D¤ > 0; implying that the social surplus from setting D = 0 is lower than the social
surplus from a race. For these cases, auctions are dominated by races. The intuition behind this
result is straightforward. In the auction, a monopoly innovator conducts all of the R&D and his rate
of investment is below the socially e±cient rate of investment. This leads to slower innovation and
reduces the present discounted value of the innovation. To motivate the monopoly innovator, the
PGA o®ers a higher prize when µ is low; it actually sets °¤ = 1 when µ = 0 and °¤ = 0:26 when
µ = 0:1. When µ is higher, the prize has a large deadweight loss and this constrains the ability of the
PGA to motivate the monopoly innovator. R&D investment decreases, slower innovation coupled
with a large deadweight loss leads to lower social revenue from the auction. The patent race eases
this trade o® between the prize and the speed of innovation. The race itself provides incentives for
higher investment and quicker innovation when the prize alone cannot be used to motivate the ¯rms.
With a race of nontrivial duration, the PGA can achieve faster innovation than the auction can for
the same prize. Hence for µ ¸ 0:25, the PGA prefers races.
Table 5: Optimal Patent Policy
¯ = 0:996, ´ = 1:0:
c µ D¤ °¤ WS=B
1.0 0.0 0 1.00 86.3
0.10 0 0.26 82.4
0.25 3 0.12 79.7
0.4 4 0.10 78.2
1.0 4 0.10 72.8
Table 6: Optimal Patent Policy
¯ = 0:996, ´ = 1:5
c µ D °¤ WS=B
1 0.0 0 1.00 87.7
0.1 0 0.34 83.0
0.25 5 0.10 81.3
0.4 5 0.10 79.9
1.0 5 0.08 75.5




fWAuc(i;0) + V M
j (0)g:
If ¯rms have the same cost, then the consumer and social surplus maximizing auctions yield the same
revenue. These revenues are reported in Table 7 for ´ = 1:0. Table 8 reports the consumer surplus
from the optimal patent races for the same parameters. For homogenous ¯rms, when µ ¸ 0:4, races
dominate auctions as innovation mechanisms. In the auction, larger prizes are needed to motivate the
23monopoly innovator and these prizes are very costly when the deadweight loss is high. In contrast,
prizes are lower in the patent race, but larger ¯ling requirements (D¤ = 4) spark competition and
lead to faster innovation and deliver a higher consumer surplus.
Table 7: Consumer Surplus of Auction
¯ = 0:996, ´ = 1:0
c µ °¤ PAuc(°¤;0;Ci;Ci;µ)





Table 8: Optimal Patent Race :
¯ = 0:996, ´ = 1:0
c µ D¤ °¤ WC=B
1.0 0.0 4 0.10 81.1
0.1 4 0.10 80.2
0.25 4 0.10 78.8
0.4 4 0.10 77.4
1.0 4 0.10 72.0
Overall, the comparison between patent auctions vs. patent races under di®erent parameteriza-
tions of our model underline the importance of deadweight loss in determining the best mechanism
for innovation.
5 Optimal Uniform Rules for Heterogeneous Innovations
In the previous sections, we assumed that the PGA knows the exact, ex-ante social value of the
innovation, B, and the innovation technologies of the two ¯rms but not their identity. Speci¯cally,
we assumed that the PGA knows the parameters of the two cost functions, but does not know any
particular ¯rm's costs; it must therefore o®er the same incentives to all ¯rms.12In reality, a patent
authority must choose race rules that apply across a broad range of industries and products, rather
than rules tailored to speci¯c ¯rms or innovations. This corresponds to Congress passing patent
law. Therefore we now consider the case where the PGA's information about the social value of
the invention and the ¯rms' technologies is poor; it only knows the distributions of social values
and cost ratios and their support, but not their exact values. Thus, it must set rules which apply
to a large set of races. Speci¯cally, we assume that the PGA's beliefs about B are given by the
probability density function g(B), that its beliefs about c = c2=c1 are represented by the density
f(c), and that its beliefs across B and c are independent. Given these beliefs, a social surplus-
maximizing PGA maximizes the expected discounted social surplus,
P
c;B WS(D;°;µ;B)f(c)g(B),
and a consumer surplus-maximizing PGA maximizes the expected discounted consumer surplus,
P
c;B WC(D;°;µ;B)f(c)g(B).
12It may be possible to elicit information about a ¯rm's costs. It may also be possible to hire ¯rms to conduct R&D
under the guidance of some central planner. However, that is not what a patent system does. Our analysis is a long
way from being a fully speci¯ed mechanism design analysis; it represents instead the nature of feasible alternatives
within a patent system. Our focus in this paper is on patent races, therefore we abstract from policies that would allow
the PGA to conduct its own research and development by employing the ¯rms in question.
24In order to study this problem, we need to specify f(c) and g(B). We do not aim to execute
a carefully calibrated exercise since the necessary data is not available. However, we do want to
compute some \average" patent rules, illustrate the ease with which we can incorporate this into
our analysis, and demonstrate the robustness of our previous results to this more general case.
Therefore, we use the little data available to construct interesting examples. Pakes (1986) provides
some documentation on the bene¯ts of innovation for some European countries, and shows that
their distribution is highly skewed: most innovations have very little or no social value and a few
innovations have very large values. However, these are ex-post realized values on innovations. Since
the patent rules we analyze are chosen before any social value is realized, the relevant data for our
model is the ex-ante distribution of values held by ¯rms when they enter a patent race. Nevertheless,
we assume that Pakes's empirical evidence represents an approximation for the distribution of ex-ante
social values, so we use highly skewed distributions for B in our numerical results.
The following table displays the two distributions;B1 and B2, for social values we use in our
computations. B1 and B2 di®er in their supports. The ¯rst row in Table 9 displays the support of
B1 and the second row the support for B2. The third row presents the probabilities for the possible
values of Bi. For example, the probability that B1 = 10 is 0.5 and the probability that B2 = 100 is
0.5.
Table 9: Distribution of B
Support for B1 10 32.5 57.5 85 120 160 210 277.5 380 600
Support for B2 100 325 575 850 1200 1600 2100 2775 3800 6000
Pr(B) 0.5 0.25 0.125 0.0625 0.0315 0.016 0.008 0.004 0.002 0.001
We use four possible distributions for the cost ratio c. We have little data on this, so we examine
four cases. We assume that c1 = 1; this is a normalization. First, we examine two possible uniform
distributions over a ¯nite set of possible values denoted Z = fz1;::;z9g. The ¯rst, denoted U1
assumes zi = 1 + (i ¡ 1):25. The second, denoted U2 assumes zi = i. We look at both cases since
they represent di®erent degrees of heterogeneity in costs and di®erent lack of information for the
PGA. We do not want the results to strongly depend on the uniform speci¯cation. Therefore, we
also consider two triangular distributions for c. More precisely, these distributions assume that the
probability that c = zi is (10 ¡ i)=45. We look at two possibilities for Z = fz1;::;z9g. The ¯rst,
denoted T1, is zi = 1 + (i ¡ 1):25, and the second, denoted by T2, is zi = i.
With these probability densities, we now compute the PGA's optimal policies. Table 10 reports
our numerical results for the social surplus maximizing policy when µ = 0. The two rightmost
columns represent the two possible beliefs about B, and the four bottom rows represent the four
possible beliefs about c. As we move down the table, the mean and variance of the belief about c
increases and as we move right the mean and variance of the belief about B increases. These results
con¯rm the generality of our previous insights. When the PGA maximizes expected social surplus,
25full length races (i.e. D¤ = N) are part of the optimal policy if there is su±cient variability in ¯rms'
costs. As we saw before, in these cases races are useful to ¯lter out the ine±cient ¯rms and motivate
the e±cient ¯rm. However, the optimal ° is far less than one when there are races, re°ecting our
earlier ¯nding that small °'s are desirable to avoid excessive duplication of e®ort. As we move right
in Table 10, the range of possible values for B increases and we see a tendency towards no race and
towards setting ° = 1. This re°ects that fact that when B is large enough, it is preferable for some
¯rm to proceed with the innovation quickly and e±ciently, so there is no race and the ¯rm that is
awarded the patent receives all social bene¯ts. We ¯nd that no race is desirable under B2, unless
the cost heterogeneity is so large that a race is needed to ¯lter out ine±cient ¯rms. We have also
computed the optimal policies for µ > 0; as µ increases, races become more desirable, for the same
reasons cited in Section 4.
Table 10: Social Surplus: Average Policies (D¤;°¤); µ = 0:






We next compute the policies that maximize expected discounted consumer surplus. Table 11
reports the results when µ = 0. As before, full length races (i.e. D¤ = N) with small ° are part of
the optimal policy if ¯rms' costs are not too variable and the bene¯ts from innovation are large. In
these cases, the competitive e®orts of the ¯rms are su±cient to provide consumers with bene¯ts even
when the prize ° is small. In particular, as the mean and variance of ¯rms' costs increases, races are
used to ¯lter out the ine±cient ¯rms but only after their presence has motivated the e±cient ¯rms
to work hard. The resulting duplication of e®ort is of no concern to consumers.







The results in Tables 10 and 11 present a few examples, but show that the results from the
conditional analyses in Section 4 are robust to the more general case where the PGA must choose
rules that apply over a wide variety of races.
266 Extensions and Conclusions
Patent races are an integral part of the R&D process, but they do not represent the complete
innovation process. A ¯rm that has been granted a patent typically needs to incur additional costs
and develop the product further before it can be produced and sold. We present an analysis of how
the two parameters of the race { when the patent or exclusive contract is awarded and the winning
prize { should be chosen in a simple multistage race.
We ¯nd that races of nontrivial duration are part of an optimal policy under most circumstances.
The choice between short and long races depends on the social returns to innovation, the planner's
objective (social vs. consumer surplus), and the ine±ciency costs of compensating the patent winner.
In general, in environments with high ine±ciency costs and externalities that restrict the rewards
to the patentholder and ¯rm heterogeneity, it is optimal for patents to be awarded earlier in the
innovation process, but not at the very initial stage. Thus races are short, but not of trivial duration.
In our setting, the patent race serves two purposes. First, it motivates the ¯rms to invest and
complete the innovation process quickly. When the prize causes ine±ciencies, such as the monopoly
grant implicit in a patent, using a race allows the planner to reduce the size of the prize and still
give ¯rms incentives to invest in innovation. Second, a race ¯lters out inferior innovators since they
cannot keep up with more e±cient ones. This is important for the planner since it cannot observe
¯rms' costs. When the planner maximizes consumer surplus, the important trade-o® is the speed of
innovation versus the prize needed to compensate the ¯rms. In this case, prizes are lower and patent
stages higher compared to the social surplus maximization case.
We show that in an environment with ine±cient transfer mechanisms, longer races are preferred
when ¯rms are homogenous and shorter races are chosen otherwise. This result overturns the con-
ventional wisdom that when ¯rms are likely to compete ¯ercely, i.e., when they possess identical
technologies in a simultaneous-move race, short races are preferable because they avoid excessive
investment. Our analysis shows that this is true only when there is very little constraint on the
prizes a patent authority can give. When there are limitations present, longer races are preferred
because they ful¯ll the role of prizes in providing incentives for innovation.
Our model allows us to understand the fundamental issues of developing a patent policy and
identifying the complex trade-o®s a patent authority faces. The environment we consider is a simple
one, but our subsequent work indicates that the results are robust to many possible extensions. For
example, one immediate extension is to consider races where ¯rms can advance more than one stage
at a time. We computed many such examples; they do not provide any substantial additional insights
into the workings of the model. We have also studied cases where the technology of investment, i.e.
the distribution F, depends on the stage of the innovation process. Again, no additional insights in
terms of the trade-o®s a patent authority faces were delivered by the modi¯ed technologies.
Another interesting extension is to allow ¯rms to trade their technologies. It is straightforward to
27allow ¯rms in our model to negotiate technology trades at each stage, similar to the trades examined
in Green and Scotchmer (1995). In the context of our model, the technology leader may want to
sell its technology to the laggard. We have studied this extension and found it to have no signi¯cant
impact on the results for optimal patent policies.
Our results indicate that once a ¯rm receives protection from competition, it reduces its invest-
ment level and slows the innovation process. The PGA varies the patent granting stage and the
prize to induce ¯rms to innovate quickly. In actual patent policy, there is a time limit on how long a
product is protected under a patent. If ¯rms develop the product too late, then they may not receive
any (substantial) prize. This time limit could also serve both as a ¯ltering device and an incentive
for quick innovation, and therefore the planner may not rely on a race to di®erentiate between ¯rms
and spur investment. However, in all of the examples we computed, we chose parameters so that the
time it takes for the ¯rms to move from the patent-granting stage to the terminal innovation stage
is short. Thus, the time limit of a patent would not signi¯cantly change any result.
It may be possible to devise other additional policy instruments that may remedy some of the
ine±ciencies that arise in the innovation race. One of the contributions of this paper is to identify the
trade-o®s the patent authority and ¯rms face as the two fundamental features of patent policy { when
a patent is granted and its associated prize { change, so that the choice of additional instruments is
not made arbitrarily.
A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. We present the proof of this proposition for the case of strictly convex
costs. The proof easily extends to the linear cost case, but it gets messy due to the possibility of cor-
ner solutions. In the trivial case ­ = 0 we have V M
i (xi) = 0 and a¤(xi) = 0 for all xi 2 f0;1;:::;Ng:
Thus, we assume throughout the proof that ­ > 0: The proof proceeds in four steps. First, we
prove that there exists a solution to the Bellman equation. Second, we show that the value function
is nondecreasing in the state. Third, we prove that there exists a unique optimal policy function.
Finally, we show that the policy function is nondecreasing in the state.
Firm i's monopoly problem is a dynamic programming problem with discounting that satis¯es
the standard assumptions for the existence of a solution, see Puterman (1994, Chapter 6) or Judd
(1998, Chapter 12). The state space is ¯nite. The discount factor satis¯es ¯ < 1: The cost function
Ci(¢) is continuous and thus bounded on the compact e®ort set A: The transition probability function
p(x0
ij¢;xi) is also continuous on A for all xi 2 f0;1;:::;Ng: Therefore, there exists a unique solution
V M
i to the Bellman equation and some optimal e®ort level a¤(xi) for each stage xi 2 f0;1;:::;Ng:
28Fix a state xi < N and an optimal e®ort level a¤(xi): The value V M
i (xi) satis¯es the equation
V M
i (xi) =
¡Ci(a¤(xi)) + ¯p(xi + 1ja¤(xi);xi)V M
i (xi + 1)
1 ¡ ¯p(xija¤(xi);xi)
:
Since Ci(¢) is nonnegative, ¯ < 1; and V M
i (xi + 1) ¸ 0 it follows that V M
i (xi) · V M
i (xi + 1):
For the remainder of the proof we make use of the special form of the transition probability
function p: Without loss of generality we assume that F is independent of the state xi and write
F(xijxi) = F < 1: Under all our assumptions (­ > 0, C(0) = 0, C0(0) = 0, and p(xijxi;ai) = Fai)
it holds that V M
i (xi) > 0 and a¤(xi) > 0 for all xi 2 f0;1;:::;Ng: Note that the optimal e®ort
level is always in the interior of the set A: Given the value function V M
i ; a necessary (and su±cient)
¯rst-order condition for the optimal e®ort level is
Fa¯ lnF(V M
i (xi) ¡ V M
i (xi + 1)) ¡ C0
i(a) = 0:
This equation must have a least one solution according to the ¯rst step of this proof. The second
derivative of the function on the left-hand side equals Fa¯(lnF)2(V M
i (xi)¡V M
i (xi+1))¡C00
i (a) < 0:
Hence, there is a unique optimal e®ort a¤(xi):
Given the value V M
i (xi + 1); the optimal e®ort a¤(xi) and value V M
i (xi) must be the (unique)
solution of the following system of two equations in the two variables a and V; respectively,
V (1 ¡ ¯Fa) ¡ ¯(1 ¡ Fa)V M
i (xi + 1) + C(a) = 0
Fa¯ lnF(V ¡ V M
i (xi + 1)) ¡ C0
i(a) = 0
An application of the Implicit Function Theorem reveals that both variables in the solution are
nondecreasing functions of the value V M
i (xi +1): The Jacobian of the function on the left-hand side
at the solution equals
J =
"
1 ¡ ¯Fa 0
Fa(¯ lnF) Fa¯(lnF)2(V ¡ V M
i (xi + 1)) ¡ C00(a)
#
:
The gradient of the function on the left-hand side with respect to the parameter V M




















Fa¯(lnF)2(V ¡ V M
i (xi + 1)) ¡ C00(a) 0






29where D = (1¡¯Fa)(Fa¯(lnF)2(V ¡V M
i (xi +1))¡C00(a)) < 0 is the determinant of the Jacobian.
The value function V M
i is nondecreasing in the state xi and a¤(xi) in nondecreasing in the value
V M
i (xi + 1): Thus, the function a¤ in nondecreasing in the state.
Proof of Theorem 1. we present again the proof for the case of strictly convex costs. For a
given patent policy (D;°) the strategy functions ¾¤
i ;i = 1;2; constitute a Markov perfect equilibrium
if they simultaneously solve equations (6). The proof is by backward induction. If xi = D for some i;
then an optimal strategy pair ¾¤
i (xi;x¡i);i = 1;2; and a pair of value functions Vi;i = 1;2; trivially
exist. It is now su±cient to prove that for any state (x1;x2) 2 X with xi < D;i = 1;2; there exists
a pure strategy Nash equilibrium (a¤
1;a¤
2). To prove the existence of such an equilibrium we de¯ne
a continuous function f on a convex and compact set such that any ¯xed point of this function is a
pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
Given are a state (x1;x2) 2 X with xi < D;i = 1;2; and values Vi(xi + 1;x¡i);Vi(xi;x¡i +
1);Vi(xi+1;x¡i+1) from the states that can be reached from (x1;x2) in one period. As in the proof
of Proposition 1 we assume without loss of generality that the transition probability distribution is
independent of the state and we write F(xijxi) = F; i = 1;2: We de¯ne a function f on a domain







+ ¯ lnF ¢
³
F ^ a¡i(Vi ¡ Vi(xi + 1;x¡i)) + (1 ¡ F ^ a¡i)(Vi(xi;x¡i + 1) ¡ Vi(xi + 1;x¡i + 1))
´
with the one unknown ai: If ± ´ F ^ a¡i(Vi ¡ Vi(xi + 1;x¡i)) + (1 ¡ F ^ a¡i)(Vi(xi;x¡i + 1) ¡ Vi(xi +
1;x¡i + 1)) is positive, then this equation has no solution. In this case we de¯ne ¶ ai = 0: If ± · 0








¢ai < 0 for all
ai 2 A). Note that ¶ ai 2 A: We de¯ne fi;1(^ ai;Vi;^ a¡i;V¡i) = ¶ ai: Note that ± is continuous in Vi: An
application of the Implicit Function Theorem shows that fi;1 is continuous in Vi:
Next de¯ne ¶ Vi by
¶ Vi =
1
1 ¡ ¯F ¶ aiF ^ a¡i
³
¡C(¶ ai) + ¯
³
F ¶ ai(1 ¡ F ^ a¡i)Vi(xi;x¡i + 1))
+(1 ¡ F ¶ ai)F ^ a¡iVi(xi + 1;x¡i)) + (1 ¡ F ¶ ai)(1 ¡ F ^ a¡i)Vi(xi + 1;x¡i + 1))
´´
:
Note that ¶ Vi 2 [0;°B] and de¯ne fi;2(^ ai;Vi;^ a¡i;V¡i) = ¶ Vi: Clearly, the function fi;2 is continuous.
In summary, we have de¯ned a continuous function f = (f1;1;f1;2;f2;1;f2;2) : S ! S mapping the





2 ) 2 S: By construction of the function f this ¯xed point satis¯es the equations
30(5) and (6). This completes the proof of the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in the
state (x1;x2):
B Computing Optimal Patent Policies
For any speci¯c patent policy, (D;°), we need to compute the equilibrium of the race which involves
solving two dynamic problems. First, we solve the dynamic optimization problem for each ¯rm after
it wins the patent. Second, we solve the patent race in the duopoly phase. We discuss the solution
procedures for these two problems in detail.
B.1 Computing the Monopoly Phase
The monopoly phase begins after one of the ¯rms reaches stage D; which can take any value between
0 and N. Therefore, we solve the monopoly problem for all xi 2 [0;N]; i = 1; 2. The successful
¯rm's value function during the monopoly phase, V M
i ; solves the Bellman equation 2. We compute
it by backward induction on states beginning at stage N and proceeding to the lower stages. At
stage N; V M
i (N) = ­ and aM
i (N) = 0: Once we have computed aM
i (x0) and V M
i (x0) for x0 > xi, we
can then compute the value functions V M
i (xi) and policy functions aM
i (xi) by using equations (2)
and (3).
In addition to employing a standard value function iteration and implementing the Gauss-Seidel
method for dynamic programming, (see p. 418 in Judd (1998)), we also occasionally use a second
approach when the convergence criterion is very tight. This second approach solves a nonlinear
system of ¯rst-order necessary and su±cient conditions. These conditions are necessary and su±cient
given our assumption on the cost and Markov transition functions. The conditions are as follows:
V M


















i) + ¸i (9)
0 = ¸iai (10)
0 · ¸i;ai: (11)
To ¯nd the solution to (8)-(11), we convert it into a nonlinear system of equations that guarantees
ai to be nonnegative. For this purpose we de¯ne
ai = maxf0;®ig· and ¸i = maxf0;¡®ig·
where · ¸ 3 is an integer and ®i 2 <. Note that, by de¯nition, equation (10) and inequalities (11)
are immediately satis¯ed. Thus, the unique solution to the nonlinear system of the two equations
31(8) and (9) with ai = maxf®i;0g· in the two unknowns V M
i (xi) and ®i yields the optimal policy
and the corresponding value function of the monopolist.13
B.2 Solving the Duopoly Phase by an Upwind Procedure
The duopoly game has a ¯nite set of states and could be solved using the techniques of Pakes and
McGuire (1994). However, we have a special structure which allows for much faster computation.
Since the game is over when one ¯rm reaches D, the monopoly phase solution provides the value for
each ¯rm at all states (x1;x2) with maxfx1;x2g = D: The solution process for the remaining stages
of the duopoly game utilizes a backward induction technique. For example, if we know the value
at (D;D), (D ¡ 1;D), and (D;D ¡ 1), then the game at (D ¡ 1;D ¡ 1) reduces to a simple game
where the only unknowns are the values and actions of each ¯rm at (D ¡ 1;D ¡ 1).
At each state (x1;x2); we compute an equilibrium action pair (¾1(x1;x2);¾2(x1;x2)) and the
corresponding values (V1(x1;x2);V2(x1;x2)) that satisfy conditions (5, 6). This computational task
is surprisingly di±cult; a Gauss-Seidel iterated best reply approach, a natural choice in such dynamic
games that solves each ¯rm's problem sequentially and updates their best responses to each other's
actions, typically does not converge in our setting. Consequently we employ an alternative algorithm.
We formulate the equilibrium problem in state (x1;x2) as a nonlinear system of equations. The
following conditions are necessary and su±cient for optimality. For i = 1;2;




























¡i) + ¸i (13)
0 = ¸iai (14)
0 · ¸i;ai: (15)
We transform this system of equations and inequalities into a nonlinear system of equations
characterizing a Nash equilibrium at a state (x1;x2) with xi; x¡i < D: We set ai = maxf0;®ig·
and ¸i = maxf0;¡®ig· in equations (12) and (13) and omit the complementary slackness conditions
(14) and the inequalities (15). The solutions to the resulting four nonlinear equations in the four
unknowns Vi(xi;x¡i) and ®i for i = 1;2; correspond to the Nash equilibrium of the stage game.
Again we solve a constrained problem instead of an unconstrained problem since this choice results
in a numerically much more stable procedure.
13The constraint on the e®ort level a can only be binding when the cost function C is linear. Nevertheless we use the
constrained-optimization approach involving a Lagrange multiplier even when we use strictly convex cost functions.
This approach is numerically much more stable than solving the ¯rst-order conditions of the unconstrained problem.
32B.3 Optimal Patent Policy
The PGA maximizes its objective function WS or WC taking into consideration the e®ect of its
policy (D;°) on ¯rms' investment. We parameterize the PGA's objective function in µ and B: Given
the equilibrium strategies ¾i (x) of the race and optimal policy function aM
i (x) during the monopoly
phase, we can de¯ne the social surplus function WS recursively as follows:
WS;D (x1;x2) = ¡
2 X
i=1






















; x1 = x2 = D
WS;M(i;xi); xi = D and x¡i < D; i = 1;2
WS;M(i;xi) = ¡Ci(aM







i); xi < N; i = 1;2
WS;M(N) = B ¡ µ°B:
The initial social surplus at t = 0 equals
WS(D;°;µ;B) = WS;D(0;0):
The consumer surplus function WC is similarly de¯ned as






















; x1 = x2 = D








i); xi < N; i = 1;2
WC;M(N) = (1 ¡ °)B ¡ µ°B:
Initial consumer surplus at t = 0 equals
WC(D;°;µ;B) = WC;D(0;0):
De¯nition 2 The social surplus maximizing patent policy is a pair (D¤; °¤) that maximizes WS(D;°;µ;B)
given (µ;B). The consumer surplus maximizing patent policy is a pair (D¤; °¤) that maximizes
WC(D;°;µ;B) given (µ;B).
We solve the dynamic equilibrium of the patent race for a large discrete set of (D;°) pairs to
¯nd the optimal PGA policy (D¤;°¤). The ratio ° takes values from a discrete set ¡ ½ [0; ¹ °]. We
summarize all computational steps in the following algorithm.
33Algorithm 1 (Computation of welfare-maximizing policy)
1. Select an objective function W 2 fWS;WCg: Fix the parameters µ and B: Choose a grid
¡ ½ [0;1]:
2. For each ° 2 ¡
(a) Set ­ = °B:
(b) Solve the monopoly problem given ­:
(c) For D = 0, compute the expected planner surplus, W(0;°;µ;B), of giving the patent
monopoly to a ¯rm chosen randomly with equal probabilities.
(d) For each D 2 f1;2;:::;Ng
i. Solve the duopoly game for x1;x2 < D:
ii. Compute the expected planner surplus, W(D;°;µ;B)
3. Find the optimal (D¤; °¤) which maximizes W(D;°;µ;B).
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